Who is turkeys leader

Most respondents did not think that the religious foundations should receive government or municipal support—an issue in the news at the time the focus groups met. Some participants complained that the Diyanet is merely a government mouthpiece rather than a true source of religious leadership. But 41 percent of AKP voters said personal behavior was mostly free, while 39 percent said it was restricted; among MHP voters, the split was 43 percent to 34 percent.

Predictably, across all parties, women were more likely to say society was restrictive, while young respondents were, perhaps surprisingly, more likely to say personal behavior was mostly free.

These complaints often seemed to provide a way for people to express a sense that traditional culture and community norms were being eroded, as well as generalized discontent about the perceived corruption of public life. But it was also clearly a gender issue, with men generally leading the complaints about women behaving too freely in public for their taste.

Conversely, several female participants praised the AKP government for having expanded professional opportunities for women. Finally, particularly among the youngest cohort of conservative voters, the resentment of performative religiosity fed into a reluctance to accept the secular-religious divide that is almost second nature to the older cohorts.

These signs of generational change are not surprising; Turkey has changed rapidly in the past 20 years and experienced dramatic internal and external crises. This last point is worth reinforcing: Younger Turks—particularly in the major cities—and their older counterparts increasingly inhabit different information ecosystems.

This is driven by deep distrust in the largely government-controlled mainstream media, which is contributing to a rapid turn to social media and online news. The growing divergence of younger and older Turks into discrete media spheres may be feeding into broader generational divides over politics and cultural life. Taken collectively, these trends could have important political implications. Certainly, more research is needed into the profile of those individuals and groups turning away from the AKP and the reasons for and likely durability of their disillusionment.

But the polling and focus groups point to some areas of obvious importance. Equally, the government—in power now for 18 years—seems to have few new ideas for how to shake Turkey from its economic malaise. Third, Turkey is in the midst of an important generational change; voters ages 18 to 29 represented 25 percent of the electorate in the last general election and will almost certainly comprise a larger share by the next vote.

They are less religious than their older counterparts across a range of measures. The youngest demographic does not seem to find the secular versus religious divide as important as their older counterparts. These broader trends have changed the political landscape, and new political personalities are seeking to take advantage of the shift. Unhappiness over the economy and the refugees, as well as the new unity of the opposition political parties, propelled the opposition parties to high-profile victories in major cities, most notably Istanbul and Ankara.

These breakaway parties hint at a broader right-wing deconsolidation. Now, ambitious dissident conservatives can hold out hope of an avenue to influence outside the AKP.

Soylu draws support from nationalists and religious conservatives, as well as disproportionate support from young people. There was some short-lived evidence of this phenomenon following the June elections, when the AKP briefly lost its parliamentary majority for the first time. This nationalist aggression is likely to extend to foreign affairs.

Alternatively, those considering sanctions on Turkey for its various perceived transgressions—including the U. For the United States and Europe, these trends and questions underpin critical strategic assessments. This step could pave the way for their expulsions. Turkish activist Osman Kavala re-arrested hours after his Gezi Park acquittal.

Read More. The move comes a few days after Turkey summoned the ambassadors of the U. The Turkish Foreign Ministry called the joint statement is "irresponsible" and said it rejected what it called attempts to influence the court system.

The corruption probes unleashed a fierce power struggle between Mr Erdogan and his erstwhile ally, the influential US-based Islamic preacher Fethullah Gulen. Another substantial setback to stability was the resumption of military operations against the Kurdish PKK armed separatist group in mid This ended a truce that had been in place since , and which had previously been trumpeted as a landmark success for Mr Erdogan's strategy of steady military pressure paired with negotiations.

These troubles culminated in a failed military coup attempt in , which prompted the president to launch a wave of arrests against his perceived opponents in the army and civil service.

He accused Fethullah Gulen of being behind the coup, which Mr Gulen has denied. It was there and in Ankara that the AKP turned local success into a national political steamroller, becoming Turkey's dominant party for years. In June , he won a new five-year term after securing outright victory in the first round of a presidential poll. It granted him sweeping new presidential powers, won in a controversial referendum in Beefing up the presidency was accompanied by a massive purge of state institutions.

That purge came after a July coup attempt that nearly toppled Mr Erdogan. His grip on power was seriously challenged by military officers - and his response was mass arrests and show trials. The crackdown drew a chorus of criticism from Western politicians and human rights groups.

In and three more times in later decades the Turkish army intervened in politics, seeing itself as the guarantor of Kemal Ataturk's secular republic.

Its shadowy nationalist influence behind the scenes came to be known as "the deep state". The AKP has shown a fierce determination to clip the military's wings. The failed coup claimed at least lives and, according to his officials, also came close to killing Mr Erdogan, who had been staying at the Aegean holiday resort of Marmaris. Yet he was back in less than 12 hours, having outmanoeuvred the plotters. He appeared on national TV and rallied supporters in Istanbul, declaring he was the "chief commander".

But the strain on the president was clear when he sobbed openly while giving a speech at the funeral of a close friend, shot with his son by mutinous soldiers.

His critics call him an autocratic leader intolerant of dissent, who harshly silences anyone who opposes him. And dissenters range from a year-old arrested for insulting the president to a former Miss Turkey who got into trouble for sharing a poem critical of the Turkish president. Mr Erdogan came to power nationally in and spent 11 years as prime minister before becoming the country's first directly-elected president in August - a supposedly ceremonial role.

His silencing of critics has caused alarm abroad, contributing to frosty relations with the EU, which has stalled Turkey's bid to join the bloc. Since the thwarted coup, more than 50, people have been detained, including many soldiers, journalists, lawyers, police officers, academics and Kurdish politicians. The authorities have sacked an estimated , public servants, and there are widespread complaints of AKP-inspired intimidation. Mr Gulen heads a global network of supporters - including Gulen schools - and his Hizmet movement has penetrated many areas of Turkish life.

But he strongly denies plotting against the AKP government. Mr Erdogan's authoritarian approach is not confined to Turkey's borders. His bodyguards harassed reporters in the US, and a German satirist was investigated in his home country for offending Mr Erdogan on TV.